War Ending Agreements

Scientific interest in seeking peace agreements as a framework for ending civil wars is growing (Hampson, 1996; Walter 1997; Bell 2000; Spears 2008; Mutwol 2009). This is because, according to Mattes and Savun (2009:737), “civil wars are more frequent, deadly and longer than intergovernmental wars and are more difficult to manage peacefully.” Functionally, peace agreements have influenced civil wars in three respects. First, in cases such as Zimbabwe (1980), Guatemala (1992-1998), Mozambique (1992-1995) and Angola III (2002), peace agreements have brought an end to civil wars (Stedman 2001); Mutwol 2009). Second, in other cases such as Sudan (1972), Sri Lanka (1989-1990), Somalia (1990), Angola I and Angola I (1991 and 1994) and Rwanda (1993), peace agreements have failed to end violent conflicts (Stedman 2001); Murshed and Verwimp 2008). The resulting effect was a return to war and the disastrous consequences that resulted. Third, in other cases such as Lebanon (1990), Cambodia (1991-1994) and Bosnia (1995), peace agreements have been partly successful (Stedman 2001). Several factors opposed the successful implementation of the first sixteen agreements negotiated to end the first Liberian civil war (Banjul I in Abuja I). In this part of the article, the principles of the peace agreement model are used as analytical and evaluation criteria to assess the impact of the various peace agreements on the end of the first Liberian civil war. Again, these two peace conferences failed to end the war. Like previous peace agreements, the essential content of the Geneva peace accords did not meet Taylor`s overall requirement to lead the transitional government and run for president in the special elections that followed in order to clarify the issue of the country`s leadership. Another recurring factor was the lack of application. ECOWAS, the OAU at the time and the United Nations were not prepared to enforce the terms of the peace agreements.

Another factor related to the limitations of the peacekeeping force`s (ECOMOG) capabilities. For example, ECOMOG did not have the size of the troops that could have enabled it to implement the provisions of the various peace agreements. Even in 1992, with its total strength, including Senegalese and Tanzanian troops, ECOMOG failed to enforce the various belligerents, whose forces were about 60,000 (Berdal 1996). In addition, ECOMOG did not have sufficient means of transport, equipment and other logistical means to improve its ability to effectively enforce the provisions of the various peace agreements. In addition, ECOMOG did not have the intelligence resources to effectively monitor the activities of the various warring factions (Adebajo 2002).